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veryone in biology keeps predicting
that the next few years will bring
answers to some of the major open
questions in evolutionary biology, but there
seems to be disagreement on
what, exactly, those questions are.
Enthusiasts of the various “-omics”
(genomics, proteomics, transcrip-
tomics, metabolomics, and even
phenomics) believe, as Michael
Lynch puts it in the final chapter
of The Origins of Genome Archi-
tecture, that “we can be confident
of two things: the basic theoretical
machinery for understanding the evolutionary
process is well established, and we will soon
be effectively unlimited by the availability of
information at the DNA level.” Others (1–4),
among whom Lynch for some reason singles
out Sean Carroll (5) for special criticism, are a
bit more skeptical. They maintain that we are
still missing some explanatory principles
accounting for the complexity of living orga-
nisms and that the tsunami of “-omics” infor-
mation, although valuable, is actually hitting a
field that is unprepared for it, both conceptu-
ally and in terms of analytical tools.
But before we get to the controversy, let me
say that the book’s first 12 chapters are a must-
read for anyone interested in the evolution of
genomes. This Origins represents a serious,
valiant, and highly scholarly attempt at mak-
ing sense of the new data provided by
the genomic revolution. To that aim, Lynch
deploys the full array of conceptual tools that
make up the modern synthesis paradigm in
evolutionary biology.
Lynch (an evolutionary biologist at
Indiana University) guides us through a host
of fascinating phenomena, from the evolution
of sex chromosomes to the disappearance of
operons in eukaryotes, from the population
biology of transposons to the mechanisms of
origin and loss of introns. Throughout, he
reminds evolutionary biologists (and perhaps
lets some molecular biologists know for the
first time) that the “population thinking” so
central to the modern synthesis, and in partic-
ular the solidly developed theory of popula-
tion genetics, ought to be part of any postge-
nomic understanding of molecular evolution.
One of the central theses of the book is that
natural selection is not necessarily the central
evolutionary mechanism, as quite a bit of the
details of genomic structures and evolution
can be accounted for by
invoking the neutral mech-
anisms of mutation, recom-
bination, and drift. Lynch is
certainly correct on this
point, and he backs his
argument with much empir-
ical and theoretical detail.
Yet, we must be hang-
ing around with different
crowds, because I hardly know anybody who
would seriously contend that evo-
lution is just a matter of natural
selection. Lynch himself cites
the now-classic paper by Gould
and Lewontin (6) railing against
“panselectionism,” and most evo-
lutionary biologists have already
gotten the message.
But the really interesting, and
certainly debatable, part of the
book is its last chapter, “Genom-
fart” (from Swedish for “the
way forward,” we are told). There
Lynch honestly states at the onset
that he is going to shift gear
and engage in an advocacy piece,
something that I found refreshing:
scientists have opinions, and they
are most interesting when they are
controversial. I have little patience
for the pretense of a “fair and
balanced view,” when we all know
that balance comes out of discus-
sions and disagreements among
peers, not from the point of view
of a single individual (7). Lynch’s
thesis, as mentioned above, is that the theoret-
ical apparatus of evolutionary theory is com-
plete and that people should stop whining
about missing pieces and the need for a new
synthesis: just study your population genetics
and everything will be all right.
This is, of course, a perfectly respectable
opinion—although the repeated, if oblique,
parallels Lynch draws between legitimate sci-
entific opponents of his view and creationists
who advocate intelligent design become
increasingly irritating by the end of the chap-
ter. Lynch, however, seems convinced that all
that evolutionary theory has to explain is
changes in allelic frequencies within popula-
tions. If that were indeed the case, the job is
done, and we are now left with simply system-
atizing the huge amounts of information com-
ing forth from genomic studies. As Carroll
complains [in (8), quoted by Lynch], this is a
rather uninspiring theme.
Lynch’s comment that science isn’t about
inspiration (I guess it truly must be about per-
spiration), however, misses Carroll’s point:
what the modern synthesis has not given us is
a theory of form, and applying population
genetics to genomics—as valuable an exercise
as that is in its own right—isn’t going to give
us one either. As much as genes are funda-
mental to the evolutionary process, there is
much more to biology than genes and their
dynamics. The very fact that molecular biolo-
gists are now talking (albeit often naïvely)
about higher-level “-omics,” all the way to
phenomics, means that they appreciate that
genomes are only a part of the story, arguably
the simplest part to figure out.
Lynch correctly identifies complexity,
modularity, robustness, and evolvability as
some of the key concepts of the recently
emerged field of evo-devo (evolution of
development), but he dismisses them as
“buzzwords,” glossing over mounting empiri-
cal and theoretical efforts aimed at articulat-
ing these notions and exploring their relations
with the standard modern synthesis. Lynch
makes a big deal out of the claim that the bur-
den of proof is on people who think these and
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of an extended synthesis in evolutionary biol-
ogy. Fair enough, although one has only
to read some of the several books in this
field that have come out during the last
decade to see that people aren’t simply shoot-
ing the breeze.
But the burden-of-proof argument cuts
both ways. Lynch boldly claims that “many
(and probably most) aspects of genomic biol-
ogy that superficially appear to have adaptive
roots … are almost certainly also products of
nonadaptive processes,” but all we get in sup-
port of this position is a plausibility argument.
Even though I agree with his contention that
neutral processes have contributed to the evo-
lution of genomes (but not, I am willing to bet,
of phenomes) to a much higher degree than
usually acknowledged, the evidence Lynch
adduces is far from overwhelming. Through-
out the book, we are treated to a series of plau-
sible scenarios about the evolution of introns,
transposons, spliceosomes, and the like.
These scenarios are backed by clever applica-
tions of population genetics theory (most of
which has been developed for simple one- or
two-loci systems, not for genomics), but they
hardly meet the high standard of historical
proof (if there can be any such thing). 
Lynch claims that nonadaptive processes
should be considered as null hypotheses, but
this gives him the unfair advantage of shifting
the burden of proof against selective scenar-
ios. What justifies this move is not at all clear,
because Lynch thinks of selection as only one
of the four fundamental mechanisms of evolu-
tion: if it is one of four, why treat it as a special
category? To see how easily the table can be
turned, just consider Dennett’s diametrically
opposite position that natural selection should
be treated as the default explanation for com-
plex phenotypes, unless one can show that it
didn’t play a role (9). A truly fair and balanced
approach is to simply treat any hypothesis as
an equal contender in the set of plausible
explanations, and see how it fares against its
opponents without the advantage of playing
on a home field.
Ultimately, the main reason we need an
expansion of the modern synthesis was
pointed out by Popper several years ago:
“[the Darwinian theory] is strictly a theory
of genes, yet the phenomenon that has to be
explained is that of the transmutation of
form” (10). Lynch’s contribution in The
Origins of Genome Architecture goes a long
way toward completing our explanation of
how genes (and genomes) change over time.
Nonetheless, although indeed necessary,
population genetics is not even close to suf-
ficient for understanding how phenotypes
evolve. There is much more to do, and a
large undiscovered country lies out there.
Let’s take a look.
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ne day in 1946, the French bio-
chemist Jacques Monod visited the
laboratories at the marine biological
station in Woods Hole. The visit made a
strong impression on him, as he noted in a let-
ter to his wife:
Very big laboratories, huge library, three
seminars a week, impressive organization,
etc. The idea that 350 biologists are working
here, that they accumulate observations;
that they complete experiments, measure-
ments, weightings; that they operate
Warburg apparatus, centrifuges, and micro-
tomes while piling up articles. All this has a
somehow depressing effect on me. I am
used to thinking that my work is something
rare, highly personal, something I have
almost invented. In my understanding, this
is what makes it valuable. Here it is no
longer possible to cherish such illusions. I
feel the same way I felt on [Jones] Beach,
when facing 50,000 cars and 500,000
bathers.
This reaction was not rare. European sci-
entists traveling in the United States during
the first decade after World War II experi-
enced mixed feelings. They perceived the U.S.
research system simultaneously as a model, a
challenge, and a threat. 
Such ambiguous relationships are at the
center of John Krige’s American Hegemony
and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in
Europe. The issue of the role the sciences
played in transatlantic affairs after 1945 is
important. We all suspect that U.S. aid was as
crucial to the reconstruction of European sci-
ence as it was to the economic reconstruction
of the old continent. However, this conclu-
sion is unsubstanti-
ated, because histo-




and the Cold War, they
have explored the
intellectual achieve-
ments of the period,
the advent of big sci-
ence as a system of
funding, or the mate-
rial culture of the
physics laboratory.
Krige’s novel and timely perspective has been
to investigate the mobilization of science for
general political goals and more precisely to
explore the uses of science policy as an
instrument in the construction of U.S. postwar
hegemony. 
Hegemony is evidently a question of
power, but it does not simply mean order,
control, and command. U.S. elites of the
postwar era placed a strong emphasis on the
intimate and quasi-natural alliance of mar-
ket economy, freedom, and democracy as
the essence of American specif icity. As
a consequence, Krige (a historian at the
Georgia Institute of Technology) suggests,
hegemony was not only to be manifested and
reproduced but also to be accepted by those
who had to live with it—and to some extent
co-constructed with them, at least with those
living on the old continent. The scientific
relations between the United States and
(Western) European countries constitute a
privileged terrain for evaluating this thesis
because the engagement of the United
States, both governmental and private, was
massive and, the book demonstrates, had
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